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Single Idea 13585
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
]
Full Idea
The properties of the most fundamental things in nature, including mass, charge, spin, and the like, would all appear to be dispositional.
Gist of Idea
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions
Source
Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.05)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.115
A Reaction
This goes with the Leibnizian claim that the most fundamental features of nature must be active in character.
Related Idea
Idea 12723
The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz]
The
107 ideas
from Brian Ellis
6616
|
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence
[Ellis]
|
6612
|
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties
[Ellis]
|
6615
|
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus
[Ellis]
|
6614
|
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws
[Ellis]
|
6613
|
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations
[Ellis]
|
23781
|
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes
[Ellis, by Williams,NE]
|
12665
|
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers
[Ellis]
|
12667
|
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability
[Ellis]
|
12666
|
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation
[Ellis]
|
12668
|
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true
[Ellis]
|
12669
|
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them
[Ellis]
|
12670
|
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy
[Ellis]
|
12673
|
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act
[Ellis]
|
12672
|
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals
[Ellis]
|
12671
|
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal
[Ellis]
|
12674
|
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism
[Ellis]
|
12675
|
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave
[Ellis]
|
12680
|
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level
[Ellis]
|
12682
|
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions
[Ellis]
|
12684
|
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal
[Ellis]
|
12676
|
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power
[Ellis]
|
12683
|
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes
[Ellis]
|
12679
|
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties
[Ellis]
|
12681
|
There are natural kinds of processes
[Ellis]
|
12685
|
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent
[Ellis]
|
12686
|
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties
[Ellis]
|
12687
|
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things
[Ellis]
|
12688
|
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things
[Ellis]
|
12689
|
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang
[Ellis]
|
12690
|
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang
[Ellis]
|
5445
|
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents
[Ellis]
|
5442
|
For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside
[Ellis]
|
5443
|
Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable
[Ellis]
|
5444
|
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to
[Ellis]
|
5448
|
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way
[Ellis]
|
5447
|
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things
[Ellis]
|
5446
|
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical
[Ellis]
|
5459
|
Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws
[Ellis]
|
5461
|
The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell
[Ellis]
|
5460
|
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once
[Ellis]
|
5453
|
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction
[Ellis]
|
5457
|
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications
[Ellis, by PG]
|
5462
|
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate
[Ellis]
|
5456
|
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent
[Ellis]
|
5458
|
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional
[Ellis]
|
5469
|
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions
[Ellis]
|
5468
|
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures)
[Ellis, by PG]
|
5466
|
Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass
[Ellis]
|
5463
|
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances
[Ellis]
|
5464
|
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
5471
|
Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws
[Ellis]
|
5473
|
The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
5474
|
Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances
[Ellis]
|
5475
|
We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws
[Ellis]
|
5472
|
Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures
[Ellis]
|
5476
|
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori
[Ellis]
|
5477
|
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else
[Ellis]
|
5478
|
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility
[Ellis]
|
5479
|
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
|
5480
|
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws
[Ellis]
|
5487
|
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology
[Ellis]
|
5491
|
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved
[Ellis]
|
5483
|
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world
[Ellis]
|
5482
|
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals
[Ellis]
|
5485
|
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue
[Ellis]
|
5484
|
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour
[Ellis]
|
5488
|
Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency
[Ellis]
|
5489
|
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions
[Ellis]
|
5490
|
Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right
[Ellis]
|
5486
|
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language
[Ellis]
|
5481
|
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects
[Ellis]
|
18398
|
Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers
[Ellis]
|
13568
|
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure
[Ellis]
|
13567
|
Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science
[Ellis]
|
13569
|
To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
13570
|
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership
[Ellis]
|
13571
|
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences
[Ellis]
|
13566
|
A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton
[Ellis]
|
13572
|
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals
[Ellis]
|
13573
|
Universals are all types of natural kind
[Ellis]
|
13574
|
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences
[Ellis]
|
13575
|
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial
[Ellis]
|
13576
|
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
[Ellis]
|
13577
|
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape
[Ellis]
|
13578
|
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists
[Ellis]
|
13579
|
What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
13581
|
Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke)
[Ellis]
|
13580
|
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do
[Ellis]
|
13582
|
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate
[Ellis]
|
13583
|
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred
[Ellis]
|
13584
|
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property
[Ellis]
|
13585
|
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions
[Ellis]
|
13586
|
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures
[Ellis]
|
13587
|
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
[Ellis]
|
13596
|
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
[Ellis]
|
13595
|
Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world
[Ellis]
|
13594
|
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties
[Ellis]
|
13599
|
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation
[Ellis]
|
13598
|
Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory)
[Ellis]
|
13597
|
Good explanations unify
[Ellis]
|
13600
|
The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential
[Ellis]
|
13601
|
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures
[Ellis]
|
13604
|
Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind
[Ellis]
|
13603
|
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
|
9436
|
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it
[Ellis]
|
13606
|
Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic
[Ellis]
|
13607
|
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved
[Ellis]
|