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Single Idea 13586

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

One view is that there must be an intrinsic property or structure in virtue of which a given thing has the behavioural disposition in question.

Gist of Idea

Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures

Source

Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.06)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.119

A Reaction

[He cites Prior, Pargetter,Jackson 1982] A key question in the metaphysics of nature - whether dispositions should be taken as primitive, or whether we should try to explain them in other terms. I take powers and dispositions to be prior to properties.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [powers as products of something more basic]:

16740 A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
16744 All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
16734 The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
15974 The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
23666 It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
13568 Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
13586 Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
15094 I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
15758 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
8547 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
8549 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
15258 Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
7023 Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
9450 If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
9498 The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
14557 Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]