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Single Idea 13586

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

One view is that there must be an intrinsic property or structure in virtue of which a given thing has the behavioural disposition in question.

Gist of Idea

Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures

Source

Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.06)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.119

A Reaction

[He cites Prior, Pargetter,Jackson 1982] A key question in the metaphysics of nature - whether dispositions should be taken as primitive, or whether we should try to explain them in other terms. I take powers and dispositions to be prior to properties.

The 35 ideas from 'Scientific Essentialism'

13567 Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis]
13568 Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
13571 Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
13570 Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
13569 To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis]
13566 A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
13572 There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis]
13573 Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis]
13574 Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis]
13575 If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
13576 Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
13577 Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
13578 The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis]
13579 What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
13581 Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
13580 Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis]
13582 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis]
13583 There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
13584 The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
13585 The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
13586 Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
13587 There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
13596 A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis]
13595 Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis]
13594 The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
13597 Good explanations unify [Ellis]
13599 Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis]
13598 Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis]
13600 The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis]
13601 Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis]
13603 A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
13604 Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis]
9436 The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
13606 Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis]
13607 If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]