more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 13587

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties ]

Full Idea

There is no natural property of 'fragility'; glasses, parchments, ecosystems and spiders' webs are fragile in their own ways, but they have nothing intrinsic or structural in common.

Gist of Idea

There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way

Source

Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.06)

Book Ref

Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.120

A Reaction

This is important (and, I think, correct) because we are inclined to say that something is 'intrinsically' fragile, but that still isn't enough to identify a true property. Ellis wants universals to be involved, and even a nominalist must sort-of agree.

The 30 ideas with the same theme [properties which constitute the natural world]:

7686 For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette]
12673 Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
13587 There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
15728 The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton]
9407 Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton]
8543 Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
8551 Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
8557 To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
15281 Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden]
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
11916 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
4603 Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
10417 There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
14933 Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
16253 A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
14932 Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]