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Single Idea 13589
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
]
Full Idea
Talk of possible worlds is a graphic way of waging the essentialist philosophy, but it is only that; it is not an explication. Essence is needed to identify an object from one possible world to another.
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism
Source
Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.118)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.118
A Reaction
He makes the proposal sound circular, but I take a commitment to essences to be prior to talk of possible worlds. Possible worlds are a tool for clarifying modalities, not for clarifying essential identities.
The
29 ideas
with the same theme
[there is no such thing as a 'possible world']:
13589
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Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism
[Quine]
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18388
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Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
[Armstrong]
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4950
|
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere
[Kripke]
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6988
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Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
[Jackson]
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14683
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Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality
[Salmon,N]
|
11109
|
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world
[Jubien]
|
11106
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If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary
[Jubien]
|
11112
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Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity
[Jubien]
|
11113
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Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds
[Jubien]
|
11105
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We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be
[Jubien]
|
11107
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If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily?
[Jubien]
|
13389
|
The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems
[Jubien]
|
13390
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Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies
[Jubien]
|
9220
|
Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular
[Shalkowski, by Sider]
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18496
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If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
[Heil]
|
8320
|
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?
[Lowe]
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16538
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We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences
[Lowe]
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10406
|
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties
[Swoyer]
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12234
|
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible'
[Oderberg]
|
19299
|
Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic
[Hale]
|
12464
|
If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible
[Jacobs]
|
12469
|
Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality
[Jacobs]
|
18746
|
Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment
[Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
18750
|
Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far
[Horsten/Pettigrew]
|
18821
|
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete
[Rumfitt]
|
12203
|
If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing?
[Rumfitt]
|
22636
|
Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless
[Ingthorsson]
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22638
|
Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied
[Ingthorsson]
|
23710
|
Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds
[Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
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