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Full Idea
The whole of quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn.
Gist of Idea
Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn
Source
Willard Quine (Intensions Revisited [1977], p.121)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.121
A Reaction
Quine offers an interesting qualification to this crushing remark in Idea 13590. The point is that objects must retain their identity in modal contexts, as if I say 'John Kennedy might have been Richard Nixon'. What could that mean?
Related Idea
Idea 13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |