more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
A causal power is a disposition of something to produce forces of a certain kind.
Gist of Idea
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
Source
Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.09)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.128
A Reaction
Hence when Leibniz was putting all his emphasis on the origin of the forces in nature, he was referring to exactly what we mean by 'powers'. From Ellis's formulation, I take powers to be more basic than dispositions. Does he realise this?
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 23774 | There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE] |
| 23791 | Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE] |
| 14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |