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Single Idea 13596
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
]
Full Idea
A causal power is a disposition of something to produce forces of a certain kind.
Gist of Idea
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
Source
Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.09)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.128
A Reaction
Hence when Leibniz was putting all his emphasis on the origin of the forces in nature, he was referring to exactly what we mean by 'powers'. From Ellis's formulation, I take powers to be more basic than dispositions. Does he realise this?
The
35 ideas
from 'Scientific Essentialism'
13567
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Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science
[Ellis]
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13568
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Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure
[Ellis]
|
13571
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Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences
[Ellis]
|
13570
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Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership
[Ellis]
|
13569
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To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds
[Ellis]
|
13566
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A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton
[Ellis]
|
13572
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There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals
[Ellis]
|
13573
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Universals are all types of natural kind
[Ellis]
|
13574
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Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences
[Ellis]
|
13575
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If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial
[Ellis]
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13576
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Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities
[Ellis]
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13577
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Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape
[Ellis]
|
13578
|
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists
[Ellis]
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13579
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What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds
[Ellis]
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13581
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Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke)
[Ellis]
|
13580
|
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do
[Ellis]
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13582
|
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate
[Ellis]
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13583
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There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred
[Ellis]
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13584
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The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property
[Ellis]
|
13585
|
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions
[Ellis]
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13586
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Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures
[Ellis]
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13587
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There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
[Ellis]
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13596
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A causal power is a disposition to produce forces
[Ellis]
|
13594
|
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties
[Ellis]
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13595
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Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world
[Ellis]
|
13597
|
Good explanations unify
[Ellis]
|
13599
|
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation
[Ellis]
|
13598
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Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory)
[Ellis]
|
13600
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The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential
[Ellis]
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13601
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Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures
[Ellis]
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13603
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A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible
[Ellis]
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13604
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Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind
[Ellis]
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9436
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The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it
[Ellis]
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13606
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Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic
[Ellis]
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13607
|
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved
[Ellis]
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