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Full Idea
The causal powers of an object are the dispositional properties of that object that are the real essences of the natural kinds of processes that involve that object in the role of cause.
Gist of Idea
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation
Source
Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.11)
Book Ref
Ellis,Brian: 'Scientific Essentialism' [CUP 2007], p.135
A Reaction
This is Ellis's formal definition at the end of his discussion of causal powers. He only seems to allow powers to the kind rather than to the individual. How do we account for the causal powers of unique genius? I say the powers are the essences.
| 12941 | There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act [Leibniz] |
| 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi] |
| 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
| 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 14314 | If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford] |
| 14325 | Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford] |
| 23774 | There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE] |
| 23791 | Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE] |
| 14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |