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Full Idea
To show the semantic difference between counterfactuals and indicative conditionals, 'If Booth hadn't shot Lincoln someone else would have' is false, but 'If Booth didn't shoot Lincoln then someone else did' is true.
Gist of Idea
'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true
Source
Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 8)
Book Ref
Sider,Theodore: 'Logic for Philosophy' [OUP 2010], p.199
A Reaction
He notes that indicative conditionals also differ in semantics from material and strict conditionals. The first example allows a world where Lincoln was not shot, but the second assumes our own world, where he was. Contextual domains?
| 9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
| 14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
| 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington] |
| 14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington] |
| 14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington] |
| 13716 | 'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider] |