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Single Idea 13719

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects ]

Full Idea

A problem with the Barcan Formula is it might be possible for there to exist a ghost, even though there in fact exists nothing that could be a ghost. There could have existed some 'extra' thing which could be a ghost.

Gist of Idea

Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost

Source

Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 9.5.2)

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Logic for Philosophy' [OUP 2010], p.239


A Reaction

Thus when we make modal claims, do they only refer to what actually exists, or is specified in our initial domain? Can a claim enlarge the domain? Are domains 'variable'? Simple claims about what might have existed seem to be a problem.


The 9 ideas with the same theme [whether non-actual objects might possibly exist]:

A thing is contingent if nothing in its essence determines whether or not it exists [Spinoza]
If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz]
That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke]
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron]
Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter]