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Single Idea 13733

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

Frege (1893) considered a definite description to be a genuine singular term (as we do), so that a sentence like 'The present King of France is bald' would have the same logical form as 'Harry Truman is bald'.

Gist of Idea

Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by M Fitting/R Mendelsohn - First-Order Modal Logic

Book Ref

Fitting,M/Mendelsohn,R: 'First-Order Modal Logic' [Synthese 1998], p.250

A Reaction

The difficulty is what the term refers to, and they embrace a degree of Meinongianism - that is that non-existent objects can still have properties attributed to them, and so can be allowed some sort of 'existence'.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [descriptions which seem to pick out a unique item]:

13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
6411 Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
10433 Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
5385 The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
18779 'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation [Montague]
5811 A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
5812 Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
5814 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
13814 Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
13816 Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
13817 Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
13813 Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
13848 We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
10444 Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
13398 We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
15414 The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
18774 Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
10671 Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]