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Single Idea 13747
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
]
Full Idea
Supervenience is mere modal correlation.
Gist of Idea
Supervenience is just modal correlation
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2)
Book Ref
'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.364
The
54 ideas
from Jonathan Schaffer
14599
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Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality)
[Schaffer,J]
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14600
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Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions
[Schaffer,J]
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14601
|
Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one
[Schaffer,J]
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14603
|
'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing
[Schaffer,J]
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14604
|
If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science
[Schaffer,J]
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14605
|
Tropes are the same as events
[Schaffer,J]
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14606
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Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible
[Schaffer,J]
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14607
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T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood
[Schaffer,J]
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14081
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Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations
[Schaffer,J]
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14082
|
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup'
[Schaffer,J]
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17304
|
As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels
[Schaffer,J]
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17306
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If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure
[Schaffer,J]
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17305
|
I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields
[Schaffer,J]
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17307
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Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges
[Schaffer,J]
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17308
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Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast
[Schaffer,J]
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10359
|
In causation there are three problems of relata, and three metaphysical problems
[Schaffer,J]
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10361
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Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly)
[Schaffer,J]
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10360
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Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects
[Schaffer,J]
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10362
|
One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*'
[Schaffer,J]
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10366
|
Causation transcends nature, because absences can cause things
[Schaffer,J]
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10367
|
There is only one fact - the True
[Schaffer,J]
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10372
|
Causation may not be transitive; the last event may follow from the first, but not be caused by it
[Schaffer,J]
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10368
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If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do
[Schaffer,J]
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10375
|
At least four rivals have challenged the view that causal direction is time direction
[Schaffer,J]
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10374
|
There are at least ten theories about causal connections
[Schaffer,J]
|
10373
|
Logical form can't dictate metaphysics, as it may propose an undesirable property
[Schaffer,J]
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10376
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The actual cause may make an event less likely than a possible more effective cause
[Schaffer,J]
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10377
|
Causation may not be a process, if a crucial part of the process is 'disconnected'
[Schaffer,J]
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10378
|
A causal process needs to be connected to the effect in the right way
[Schaffer,J]
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10382
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Causation can't be a process, because a process needs causation as a primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10381
|
All four probability versions of causation may need causation to be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10383
|
The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation!
[Schaffer,J]
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10380
|
Causation is primitive; it is too intractable and central to be reduced; all explanations require it
[Schaffer,J]
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10385
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If causation is just observables, or part of common sense, or vacuous, it can't be primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10387
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The notion of causation allows understanding of science, without appearing in equations
[Schaffer,J]
|
10388
|
Causation is utterly essential for numerous philosophical explanations
[Schaffer,J]
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10384
|
If two different causes are possible in one set of circumstances, causation is primitive
[Schaffer,J]
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10386
|
If causation is primitive, it can be experienced in ourselves, or inferred as best explanation
[Schaffer,J]
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10389
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Causal order must be temporal, or else causes could be blocked, and time couldn't be explained
[Schaffer,J]
|
10390
|
Causal order is not temporal, because of time travel, and simultanous, joint or backward causes
[Schaffer,J]
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10393
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Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis
[Schaffer,J]
|
10394
|
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection
[Schaffer,J]
|
13734
|
Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding
[Schaffer,J]
|
13739
|
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances
[Schaffer,J]
|
13743
|
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like
[Schaffer,J]
|
13741
|
If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers'
[Schaffer,J]
|
13744
|
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction
[Schaffer,J]
|
13740
|
'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument
[Schaffer,J]
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13742
|
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way
[Schaffer,J]
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13747
|
Supervenience is just modal correlation
[Schaffer,J]
|
13748
|
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics
[Schaffer,J]
|
13751
|
If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse
[Schaffer,J]
|
13749
|
Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism
[Schaffer,J]
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13752
|
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't
[Schaffer,J]
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