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Single Idea 13770
[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
]
Full Idea
As well as conditional beliefs, there are conditional desires, hopes, fears etc. As well as conditional statements, there are conditional commands, questions, offers, promises, bets etc.
Gist of Idea
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts
Source
Dorothy Edgington (Conditionals [2001], 17.3.4)
Book Ref
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.408
The
28 ideas
from Dorothy Edgington
13764
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Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'?
[Edgington]
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13765
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'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens
[Edgington]
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13768
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Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter
[Edgington]
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13770
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There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts
[Edgington]
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14270
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Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind
[Edgington]
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14269
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Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives
[Edgington]
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14271
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Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF
[Edgington]
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14272
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I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true?
[Edgington]
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14274
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Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism
[Edgington]
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14273
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Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if'
[Edgington]
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14276
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The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true
[Edgington]
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14275
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Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics
[Edgington]
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14278
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Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe
[Edgington]
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14281
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A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100%
[Edgington]
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14282
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On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A
[Edgington]
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14284
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Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments
[Edgington]
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14287
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Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there?
[Edgington]
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14290
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Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient!
[Edgington]
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13855
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A conditional does not have truth conditions
[Edgington]
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13853
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It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is
[Edgington]
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13854
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Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition
[Edgington]
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13857
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Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake
[Edgington]
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13859
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X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B
[Edgington]
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12185
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Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori
[Edgington, by McFetridge]
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12207
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Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature
[Edgington]
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12206
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Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion
[Edgington]
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12208
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An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary
[Edgington]
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12205
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There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength
[Edgington]
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