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Single Idea 13779

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species ]

Full Idea

It seems to me that it is right to call a lion's offspring a 'lion' and a horse's offspring a 'horse' (I'm talking about natural offspring, not some monster). ...but by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a 'king'.

Gist of Idea

The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?)

Source

Plato (Cratylus [c.377 BCE], 393b)

Book Ref

Plato: 'Complete Works', ed/tr. Cooper,John M. [Hackett 1997], p.112


A Reaction

The standard modern difficulty is whether all descendants of dinosaurs are still called 'dinosaur', which they are not.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [dividing living things into distinct groups]:

The natural offspring of a lion is called a 'lion' (but what about the offspring of a king?) [Plato]
Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi]
Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach]
'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke]
Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke]
The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke]
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]
Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha]