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Single Idea 13790
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
]
Full Idea
The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names to be consistent with it.
Gist of Idea
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it
Source
Plato (Cratylus [c.375 BCE], 436c)
Book Ref
Plato: 'Complete Works', ed/tr. Cooper,John M. [Hackett 1997], p.152
A Reaction
Lovely. This is Gareth Evans's 'Madagascar' example. See Idea 9041.
Related Idea
Idea 9041
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
The
32 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about how names function in sentences]:
13777
|
A name is a sort of tool
[Plato]
|
13790
|
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it
[Plato]
|
13791
|
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge
[Plato]
|
12974
|
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies
[Leibniz]
|
10427
|
All names are names of something, real or imaginary
[Mill]
|
18772
|
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name
[Frege]
|
8447
|
In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference
[Frege]
|
6102
|
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to
[Russell]
|
10423
|
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name
[Russell, by Sainsbury]
|
9364
|
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing
[Lewis,CI]
|
18727
|
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied
[Wittgenstein]
|
4139
|
Naming is a preparation for description
[Wittgenstein]
|
23506
|
Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed
[Wittgenstein]
|
8453
|
If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers
[Quine]
|
10788
|
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference
[Marcus (Barcan)]
|
10786
|
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun
[Marcus (Barcan)]
|
17505
|
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions
[Putnam]
|
14650
|
Maybe proper names involve essentialism
[Plantinga]
|
10437
|
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions
[Kripke, by Sainsbury]
|
4949
|
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds
[Kripke]
|
9038
|
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
[Evans]
|
5824
|
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
[Evans]
|
9042
|
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
[Evans]
|
13360
|
In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object
[Bostock]
|
12650
|
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file
[Fodor]
|
12648
|
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind
[Fodor]
|
3005
|
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties
[Fodor]
|
13402
|
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes
[Jubien]
|
13405
|
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category
[Jubien]
|
12876
|
Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name
[Simons]
|
13134
|
We negate predicates but do not negate names
[Westerhoff]
|
18935
|
Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful
[Sawyer]
|