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Single Idea 13807
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
]
Full Idea
P is 'extraneously essential' to x iff it is possessed by x at any world w only in virtue of the possession at w of certain properties by other objects.
Gist of Idea
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects
Source
Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)
Book Ref
'Midwest Studs XI:Essentialism', ed/tr. French,Uehling,Wettstein [Minnesota 1986], p.4
A Reaction
I would say that these are the sorts of properties which have nothing to do with being essential, even if they are deemed to be necessary.
Related Idea
Idea 13806
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
The
32 ideas
from Graeme Forbes
13804
|
A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property
[Forbes,G]
|
13805
|
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature
[Forbes,G]
|
13808
|
A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist
[Forbes,G]
|
13806
|
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities
[Forbes,G]
|
13807
|
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects
[Forbes,G]
|
13810
|
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing
[Forbes,G]
|
13809
|
One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made
[Forbes,G]
|
11885
|
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
|
11888
|
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic
[Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
|
12003
|
De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities
[Forbes,G]
|
12004
|
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
[Forbes,G]
|
12005
|
The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)'
[Forbes,G]
|
12008
|
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them
[Forbes,G]
|
12009
|
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects
[Forbes,G]
|
12007
|
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own
[Forbes,G]
|
12010
|
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?
[Forbes,G]
|
12014
|
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have
[Forbes,G]
|
12015
|
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational
[Forbes,G]
|
12013
|
Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
[Forbes,G]
|
12012
|
Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist
[Forbes,G]
|
12011
|
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things
[Forbes,G]
|
12016
|
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences
[Forbes,G]
|
12017
|
In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity
[Forbes,G]
|
12020
|
An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin
[Forbes,G]
|
12021
|
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness
[Forbes,G]
|
12022
|
Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact
[Forbes,G]
|
12023
|
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages
[Forbes,G]
|
12024
|
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock.
[Forbes,G]
|
12025
|
Artefacts have fuzzy essences
[Forbes,G]
|
12027
|
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory
[Forbes,G]
|
12029
|
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual
[Forbes,G]
|
12028
|
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is
[Forbes,G]
|