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Single Idea 13808

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties ]

Full Idea

A relation R is essential to x and y (in that order) iff Rxy holds at every world where x and y both exist.

Gist of Idea

A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist

Source

Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 2)

Book Ref

'Midwest Studs XI:Essentialism', ed/tr. French,Uehling,Wettstein [Minnesota 1986], p.4

A Reaction

I find this bizarre. Not only does this seem to me to have nothing whatever to do with essence, but also the relation might hold even though it is a purely contingent matter. All rabbits are a reasonable distance from the local star. Essence of rabbit?

The 32 ideas from Graeme Forbes

13804 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
13805 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
13808 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
13806 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
13807 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
13809 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
12003 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
12005 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
12008 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
12009 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
12007 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
12013 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
12012 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
12011 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
12016 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
12017 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
12020 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
12021 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
12022 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
12023 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
12024 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
12025 Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
12027 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
12029 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]