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Single Idea 13809

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts ]

Full Idea

In the case of artefacts, there is an essentialism about original matter; for instance, it would be said of any particular bronze statue that it could not have been cast from a totally different quantity of bronze.

Gist of Idea

One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made

Source

Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)

Book Ref

'Midwest Studs XI:Essentialism', ed/tr. French,Uehling,Wettstein [Minnesota 1986], p.10


A Reaction

Forbes isn't endorsing this, and it doesn't sound convincing. He quotes the thought 'I wish I had made this pot from a different piece of clay'. We might corrupt a statue by switching bronze, but I don't think the sculptor could do so.


The 32 ideas from Graeme Forbes

A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]