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Single Idea 13817

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions ]

Full Idea

In practice, definite descriptions are for the most part treated as names, since this is by far the most convenient notation (even though they have scope). ..When a description is uniquely satisfied then it does behave like a name.

Gist of Idea

Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer

Source

David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3)

Book Ref

Bostock,David: 'Intermediate Logic' [OUP 1997], p.347


A Reaction

Apparent names themselves have problems when they wander away from uniquely picking out one thing, as in 'John Doe'.

Related Idea

Idea 13816 Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]


The 21 ideas with the same theme [descriptions which seem to pick out a unique item]:

Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell]
Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury]
The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell]
'The' is a quantifier, like 'every' and 'a', and does not result in denotation [Montague]
A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan]
Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan]
'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan]
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien]
The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess]
Definite descriptions, unlike proper names, have a logical structure [Linsky,B]
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]