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Single Idea 13839

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic ]

Full Idea

For some purposes the variables of first-order logic can be regarded as prepositions and place-holders that could in principle be dispensed with, say by a system of arrows indicating what places fall in the scope of which quantifier.

Gist of Idea

Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers

Source

Ian Hacking (What is Logic? [1979], §11)

Book Ref

'A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic', ed/tr. Hughes,R.I.G. [Hackett 1993], p.242


A Reaction

I tend to think of variables as either pronouns, or as definite descriptions, or as temporary names, but not as prepositions. Must address this new idea...


The 19 ideas with the same theme [symbols which do not yet have a determined value]:

The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell]
Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell]
Variables are auxiliary notions, and not part of the 'eternal' essence of logic [Schönfinkel]
'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein]
'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine]
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
Perhaps variables could be dispensed with, by arrows joining places in the scope of quantifiers [Hacking]
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
I think of variables as objects rather than as signs [Fine,K]
It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K]
In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K]
The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K]
Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K]
The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K]
'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K]
All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess]
When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider]
We now see that generalizations use variables rather than abstract entities [Sorensen]
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]