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Single Idea 13865
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
]
Full Idea
A concept is 'sortal' if it exemplifies a kind of object. ..In English predication of a sortal concept needs an indefinite article ('an' elm). ..What really constitutes the distinction is that it involves grasping identity for things which fall under it.
Gist of Idea
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities
Source
Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.i)
Book Ref
Wright,Crispin: 'Frege's Conception of Numbers' [Scots Philosophical Monographs 1983], p.2
A Reaction
This is a key notion, which underlies the claims of 'sortal essentialism' (see David Wiggins).
Related Ideas
Idea 11896
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Idea 13866
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
The
28 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about concepts]:
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20804
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Concepts are intellectual phantasms
[Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
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12911
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Concepts are what unite a proposition
[Leibniz]
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17616
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Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
[Kant]
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5553
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Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
[Kant]
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5593
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Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
[Kant]
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15607
|
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts
[Hegel]
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15610
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Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it
[Hegel]
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20953
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Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not
[Hegel, by Bowie]
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8715
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Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability
[Cantor, by Friend]
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23189
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Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations
[Nietzsche]
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23192
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Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit
[Nietzsche]
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9870
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Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted
[Frege, by Dummett]
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5384
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A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept'
[Russell]
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16366
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The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
[Evans]
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8245
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The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces
[Deleuze/Guattari]
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13865
|
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities
[Wright,C]
|
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13866
|
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity
[Wright,C]
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16535
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A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist
[Lowe]
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10344
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Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
[Kusch]
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10110
|
Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets)
[George/Velleman]
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17980
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The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge
[Murphy]
|
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16365
|
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents)
[Recanati]
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8688
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Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization)
[Friend]
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19088
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For pragmatists a concept means its consequences
[Macbeth]
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11120
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Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses
[Margolis/Laurence]
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18574
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Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different
[Machery]
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18588
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Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location
[Machery]
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18611
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We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory'
[Machery]
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