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Single Idea 13877

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers ]

Full Idea

When a class of terms functions as singular terms, and the sentences are true, then those terms genuinely refer. Being singular terms, their reference is to objects. There is no further question whether they really refer, and there are such objects.

Gist of Idea

Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence

Source

Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iii)

Book Ref

Wright,Crispin: 'Frege's Conception of Numbers' [Scots Philosophical Monographs 1983], p.14

A Reaction

This seems to be a key sentence, because this whole view is standardly called 'platonic', but it certainly isn't platonism as we know it, Jim. Ontology has become an entirely linguistic matter, but do we then have 'sakes' and 'whereaboutses'?

Related Idea

Idea 13876 The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C]

The 38 ideas from Crispin Wright

17441 Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
10140 We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
8692 Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
17440 Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
7804 Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
9878 Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
10142 The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
9868 An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
13861 Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
13863 Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
17853 Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
13862 There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
17854 What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
13860 We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
13867 Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
13869 Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
13870 We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
13868 Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
13866 A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
13865 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
13877 Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
13873 Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
17857 We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
13883 The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
13882 A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
13884 The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
13885 If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
13890 Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
13888 If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
13894 Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
13893 It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
13892 One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
13899 The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
13896 The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
13895 The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
13898 If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
12189 Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge]
7320 Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A]