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Single Idea 13878

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts ]

Full Idea

For Frege concepts are, precisely, the Bedeutungen of predicates.

Clarification

'Bedeutungen' in normally translated as 'references'

Gist of Idea

Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 1.iv

Book Ref

Wright,Crispin: 'Frege's Conception of Numbers' [Scots Philosophical Monographs 1983], p.15

A Reaction

On p.17 Wright challenges Frege's right to make that assumption.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]:

9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
13878 Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
7736 A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
17430 Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
8622 Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19168 Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
13475 The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
22290 The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]