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Full Idea
For Frege (as opposed to Gödel) the epistemological aim is not to relate to the objects which are the subject-matter of number theory, but to relate to the states of affairs that make for the truth of number-theoretic statements.
Gist of Idea
We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 1.v
Book Ref
Wright,Crispin: 'Frege's Conception of Numbers' [Scots Philosophical Monographs 1983], p.25
A Reaction
I am beginning to see that this is a key issue in modern philosophy, of whether we build our metaphysics on the things of the world or on the truths about the world. I vote for the things, because the other way slides into anti-realism.
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
14397 | Truthmaker demands not just a predication, but an existing state of affairs with essential ingredients [Merricks] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |