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Single Idea 1392

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness ]

Full Idea

In the case of the man who, like an amoeba, divides….we can suggest that he survives as two different people without implying that he is those people.

Gist of Idea

If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us

Source

Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §1)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.203


A Reaction

Maybe an amoeba is a homogeneous substance for which splitting is insignificant, but when a person has certain parts that are totally crucial, splitting them is catastrophic, and quite different. I'm not sure that splitting a self would leave persons.


The 5 ideas with the same theme [problems with the possibility of dividing consciousness or brain]:

If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]