more on this theme | more from this text
Full Idea
In the case of the man who, like an amoeba, divides….we can suggest that he survives as two different people without implying that he is those people.
Gist of Idea
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us
Source
Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §1)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.203
A Reaction
Maybe an amoeba is a homogeneous substance for which splitting is insignificant, but when a person has certain parts that are totally crucial, splitting them is catastrophic, and quite different. I'm not sure that splitting a self would leave persons.
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |