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Full Idea
How is the case in which A exists prior to B, but is distinct from B, different (especially from B's point of view) from the case in which nothing exists prior to B?
Gist of Idea
If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed
Source
Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
Book Ref
'Persistence: contemporary readings', ed/tr. Haslanger,S/|Kurtz,RM [MIT 2006], p.173
A Reaction
I sympathise with her view, but this isn't persuasive. For A substitute 'Sally's mother' and for B substitute 'Sally'. A 4D-ist could bite the bullet and say that, indeed, previous parts of my 'worm' need not have existed.
Related Ideas
Idea 13927 We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
Idea 2792 It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |