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Single Idea 1393

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity ]

Full Idea

If I say 'It will not be me, but one of my future selves', I do not imply that I will be that future self. He is one of my later selves, and I am one of his earlier selves. There is no underlying person we both are.

Gist of Idea

One of my future selves will not necessarily be me

Source

Derek Parfit (Personal Identity [1971], §5)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.219


A Reaction

The problem here seems to be explaining why I should care about my later self, if it isn't me. If the answer is only that it will be psychologically very similar to me, then I would care more about my current identical twin than about my future self.


The 13 ideas from Derek Parfit

Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]
Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]