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Single Idea 1394

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations ]

Full Idea

If the mind is merely a bundle of states and events, it must be logically possible for the various elements of the bundle to exist on their own.

Gist of Idea

Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own?

Source

Peter Carruthers (Introducing Persons [1986], 2.iii (A))

Book Ref

Carruthers,Peter: 'Introducing Persons' [Routledge 1992], p.52


A Reaction

Depends how literally you take the bundle metaphor, and how much you are worried about 'logical' possibility (which only seems to mean imaginable). The answers to these questions do not have to be all-or-nothing.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [Self is a unity formed by associating mental events]:

Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]