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Single Idea 13942
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
]
Full Idea
The current fashion among logicians of taking sentences to be the bearers of truth and falsity indicates less an agreement on philosophical theory than a desire for rigor and smoothness in calculative practice.
Gist of Idea
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
Source
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
Book Ref
Cartwright,Richard: 'Philosophical Essays' [MIT 1987], p.33
A Reaction
A remark close to my heart. Propositions are rejected first because language offers hope of answers, then because they seem metaphysically odd, and finally because you can't pin them down rigorously. But the blighters won't lie down and die.
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[sorts of items capable of truth and falsehood]:
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20823
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The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier
[Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
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6021
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It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
[Sext.Empiricus]
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12522
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It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas
[Locke]
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12523
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If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one
[Locke]
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12558
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Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions
[Locke]
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19389
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Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts
[Leibniz]
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19388
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True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false
[Leibniz]
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5644
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In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false
[Hegel, by Scruton]
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8187
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Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions
[Frege, by Dummett]
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6442
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Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
[Russell]
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5784
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In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs
[Russell]
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14102
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What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions'
[Russell]
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5419
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Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements
[Russell]
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17652
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Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved
[Goodman]
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3745
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Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth?
[O'Connor]
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8188
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Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences
[Davidson, by Dummett]
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13942
|
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
[Cartwright,R]
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13941
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Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements?
[Cartwright,R]
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10845
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To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive
[Lewis]
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2435
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Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
[Fodor]
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18369
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There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers
[Kirkham]
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18996
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A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
[Yablo]
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21616
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Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions
[Williamson]
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4737
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Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?
[Engel]
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15348
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Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth
[Horsten]
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