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Single Idea 13942
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
]
Full Idea
The current fashion among logicians of taking sentences to be the bearers of truth and falsity indicates less an agreement on philosophical theory than a desire for rigor and smoothness in calculative practice.
Gist of Idea
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
Source
Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], 01)
Book Ref
Cartwright,Richard: 'Philosophical Essays' [MIT 1987], p.33
A Reaction
A remark close to my heart. Propositions are rejected first because language offers hope of answers, then because they seem metaphysically odd, and finally because you can't pin them down rigorously. But the blighters won't lie down and die.
The
19 ideas
from Richard Cartwright
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9783
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While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes
[Cartwright,R]
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9784
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A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system
[Cartwright,R]
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9786
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Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard
[Cartwright,R]
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13952
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Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent
[Cartwright,R]
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13953
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An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind
[Cartwright,R]
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13954
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The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential
[Cartwright,R]
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13955
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Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic
[Cartwright,R]
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13941
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Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements?
[Cartwright,R]
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13942
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Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
[Cartwright,R]
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13943
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We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said
[Cartwright,R]
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13944
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We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each
[Cartwright,R]
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13946
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To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words
[Cartwright,R]
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13947
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'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same
[Cartwright,R]
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13948
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For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have
[Cartwright,R]
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13951
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Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false....
[Cartwright,R]
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13950
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People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter
[Cartwright,R]
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13945
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A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows
[Cartwright,R]
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14961
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Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart
[Cartwright,R]
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14962
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Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts
[Cartwright,R]
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