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Single Idea 13945

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity ]

Full Idea

We cannot take a token of a word to be an occurrence of it. Suppose there is exactly one occurrence of the word 'etherized' in the whole of English poetry? Exactly one 'token'? This sort of occurrence is like the occurrence of a number in a sequence.

Gist of Idea

A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows

Source

Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], Add 2)

Book Ref

Cartwright,Richard: 'Philosophical Essays' [MIT 1987], p.53


A Reaction

This remark is in an addendum to his paper, criticising his own lax use of the idea of 'token' in the actual paper. The example nicely shows that the type/token distinction isn't neat and tidy - though I consider it very useful.


The 19 ideas from Richard Cartwright

While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]