more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 13953
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
]
Full Idea
For an ostension to be successful it is surely not necessary that I gather what sort of object it is you have indicated, such as being a horse or a zebra. I may even gather which thing you have indicated without knowing that it is a mammal or even alive.
Clarification
An 'ostension' is an act of pointing out
Gist of Idea
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind
Source
Richard Cartwright (Some Remarks on Essentialism [1968], p.157)
Book Ref
Cartwright,Richard: 'Philosophical Essays' [MIT 1987], p.157
A Reaction
This nicely articulates the objection I have always felt to Geach's relative identity. 'Oh my God, what the hell is THAT???' is probably going to be a successful act of verbal reference, even while explicitly denying all knowledge of sortals.
The
19 ideas
from Richard Cartwright
9783
|
While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes
[Cartwright,R]
|
9784
|
A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system
[Cartwright,R]
|
9786
|
Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard
[Cartwright,R]
|
13952
|
Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent
[Cartwright,R]
|
13953
|
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind
[Cartwright,R]
|
13954
|
The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential
[Cartwright,R]
|
13955
|
Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic
[Cartwright,R]
|
13941
|
Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements?
[Cartwright,R]
|
13942
|
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
[Cartwright,R]
|
13943
|
We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said
[Cartwright,R]
|
13944
|
We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each
[Cartwright,R]
|
13946
|
To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words
[Cartwright,R]
|
13947
|
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same
[Cartwright,R]
|
13948
|
For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have
[Cartwright,R]
|
13950
|
People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter
[Cartwright,R]
|
13951
|
Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false....
[Cartwright,R]
|
13945
|
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows
[Cartwright,R]
|
14961
|
Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart
[Cartwright,R]
|
14962
|
Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts
[Cartwright,R]
|