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Single Idea 13960

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths ]

Full Idea

Both the 'primary' and 'secondary' intension qualify as truths in virtue of meaning; they are simply true in virtue of different aspects of meaning.

Gist of Idea

In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning

Source

David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.4)

Book Ref

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.62


A Reaction

This is the view of two-dimensional semantics, which has split Fregean sense into an a priori and an a posterior part. Chalmers is trying to hang onto the idea that we might see necessity as largely analytic.

Related Ideas

Idea 13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]

Idea 13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]


The 12 ideas with the same theme [propositions that are true simply because of their words]:

The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis]
The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey]
Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers]
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]