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Single Idea 13964

[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics ]

Full Idea

The semantic content of a sentence is not the set of circumstances supporting its truth. It is rather the semantic content of a structured proposition the constituents of which are the semantic contents of the constituents of the sentence.

Gist of Idea

Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances)

Source

Scott Soames (Why Propositions Aren't Truth-Supporting Circumstance [2008], p.74)

Book Ref

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophical Essays 2:Significance of Language' [Princeton 2009], p.74

A Reaction

I'm not sure I get this, but while I like the truth-conditions view, I am suspicious of any proposal that the semantic content of something is some actual physical ingredients of the world. Meanings aren't sticks and stones.

The 17 ideas from Scott Soames

13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
15152 To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
15153 Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
15157 Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames]
15156 The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames]
15158 Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
15162 We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames]
15161 There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames]
15163 The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames]
13964 Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames]
13965 Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames]