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Single Idea 13967

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible ]

Full Idea

With Kripke's essentialist route to the necessary a posteriori came a sharp distinction between conceivability and genuine possibility - ways things could conceivably be versus ways things could really be (or have been).

Gist of Idea

Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible

Source

comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Scott Soames - Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori p.167

Book Ref

Soames,Scott: 'Philosophical Essays 2:Significance of Language' [Princeton 2009], p.167


A Reaction

A key idea, for me. I love 'could there be a bonfire on the moon?' Imagining it is easy-peasy. 'Could wood combine with oxygen when there is no oxygen present?' We imagined it all right, but did we 'conceive' it?


The 26 ideas with the same theme [ if conceivable then it is possible]:

Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
People who are ignorant of true causes imagine anything can change into anything else [Spinoza]
Error does not result from imagining, but from lacking the evidence of impossibility [Spinoza]
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
Conceivability is no proof of possibility [Putnam]
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke]
Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames]
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Chalmers, by Stalnaker]
Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Chalmers, by Vaidya]
Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers]
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen]
Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird]
Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]
If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya]
Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya]