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Single Idea 13978

[filed under theme 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning ]

Full Idea

It is argued by Husserl and (virtually) by Meinong that only if there are such entities as objective Meanings - and propositions are just a species of Meaning - is there anything for Logic to be about.

Gist of Idea

Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)

Book Ref

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.21


A Reaction

It is presumably this proposal which led to the scepticism about meanings in Wittgenstein, Quine and Kripke. The modern view, which strikes me as right, is that logic is about inference, and so doesn't need a subject-matter.


The 13 ideas from 'Are there propositions?'

There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]