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Single Idea 13980

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement ]

Full Idea

Those who find 'judgments' everywhere and propositions nowhere find that some judgments cohere whereas others are incoherent. What is the status of the terms between which these relations hold?

Gist of Idea

If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment?

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)

Book Ref

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.22


A Reaction

Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this strikes me as a nice point. I presume Russell after 1906 is the sort of thinker he has in mind.

Related Ideas

Idea 13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]

Idea 7534 In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]


The 26 ideas from Gilbert Ryle

There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]