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Single Idea 13981

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'.

Gist of Idea

Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)

Book Ref

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.22


A Reaction

Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion.

Related Idea

Idea 13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]


The 13 ideas from 'Are there propositions?'

There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]