more on this theme     |     more from this text

Single Idea 13981

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

We ordinarily find no difficulty in saying of a given thing that several people believe it and so, if they think it false, 'make the same mistake' or 'labour under the same delusion'.

Gist of Idea

Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], IV)

Book Ref

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.22

A Reaction

Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but this (like 13980) strikes me as quite good support for propositions. I suppose you can describe these phenomena as assent to sentences, but they might be very different sentences to express the same delusion.

Related Idea

Idea 13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]

The 26 ideas from Gilbert Ryle

13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
18004 We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
2388 Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
3354 You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
2387 How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
18005 Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
1353 Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
1354 We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
2620 Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
2622 Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
14300 No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
2624 I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
10800 The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]