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Single Idea 13982

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique ]

Full Idea

All the arguments for the subsistence of true propositions seem to hold good for the subsistence of false ones. We might even have to find room for absurd or nonsensical ones like 'some round squares are not red-headed'.

Gist of Idea

If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections')

Book Ref

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.25


A Reaction

A particularly nice example of a Category Mistake from the man who made them famous. Why can't we just make belief a proposition attitude, so I equally believe 'sea is blue', 'grass is pink' and 'trees are bifocal', but the status of my belief varies?


The 15 ideas with the same theme [rejection of the existence of propositions]:

An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]