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Single Idea 13987

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

Although we speak of thinking in French, we never talk of knowing or believing or opining in French.

Gist of Idea

We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French

Source

Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Substitute')

Book Ref

Ryle,Gilbert: 'Collected Essays 2 1929-1968' [Routledge 2009], p.33


A Reaction

Once again Ryle is playing devil's advocate, but he does it rather well, and offers good support for my belief in propositions. I love this. 'I know, in French, a bank where the wild thyme blows'.


The 26 ideas from Gilbert Ryle

There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
We can't do philosophy without knowledge of types and categories [Ryle]
Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle]
You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle]
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle]
Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle]
We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle]
Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle]
Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle]
A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle]
I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle]
The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]