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Single Idea 14004

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive ]

Full Idea

Davidson claims that we require the existence of events in order to make sense of a) action statements, b) causal statements, c) explanation, d) the mind-body problem, and e) the logic of adverbial modification.

Gist of Idea

We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs

Source

report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969], Intro IIb) by Craig Bourne - A Future for Presentism

Book Ref

Bourne,Craig: 'A Future for Presentism' [OUP 2006], p.7


A Reaction

Events are a nice shorthand, but I don't like them in a serious ontology. Prior says there objects and what happens to them; Kim reduces events to other things. Processes are more clearly individuated than events.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [treating happenings as basic ingredients of existence]:

In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling]
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons]
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]