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Full Idea
Those who say that the soul is incorporeal are speaking to no point; for if it were of that character, it could neither act nor be acted upon at all.
Gist of Idea
The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon
Source
Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 67)
Book Ref
Epicurus: 'The Epicurus Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B. /Gerson,L. [Hackett 1994], p.14
A Reaction
This just is the causal argument, which is espoused by Papineau and other modern physicalists. Personally I am inclined to agree with Papineau, that it is so simple and conclusive that it is hardly worth discussing further. Dualism needs a miracle.
Related Idea
Idea 14043 The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus]
14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
20816 | A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
3941 | How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley] |
22100 | Experienced time means no two mental moments are ever alike [Bergson] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |