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Single Idea 14045

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes ]

Full Idea

Accidental qualities are not non-existent, nor are they distinct corporeal entities inhering in the body, nor parts of it. We should think that the whole body throughout derives its permanent nature from these properties, though not as a compound of them.

Gist of Idea

Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies

Source

Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 69)

Book Ref

Epicurus: 'The Epicurus Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B. /Gerson,L. [Hackett 1994], p.14


A Reaction

'Permanent' nature sounds more like essential than accidental properties. This is uncomfortably negative in its attempt to pin down what accidental properties are. The last bit seems to deny the bundle view of objects. Would he like tropes?

Related Ideas

Idea 14044 The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]

Idea 14046 A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]

Idea 14047 Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]


The 17 ideas with the same theme [properties as simply ways of existing]:

Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal [Aristotle]
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]
Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus]
Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject [Aquinas]
Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white [Aquinas]
There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
Modes of things exist in some way, without being full-blown substances [Gassendi]
If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi]
Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes]
A 'mode' is an aspect of a substance, and conceived through that substance [Spinoza]
Everything that exists is either a being, or some mode of a being [Malebranche]
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau]