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Single Idea 14065

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law ]

Full Idea

For two things to be strictly identical, they must have all properties in common. That means, among other things, that they must start to exist at the same time and cease to exist at the same time.

Gist of Idea

Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times

Source

Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I)

Book Ref

-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.188


A Reaction

I don't accept that coming into existence at time t is a 'property' of a thing. Coincident objects give you the notion of 'existing as' something, which complicates the whole story.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [identical objects must have identical features or truths]:

Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
Two substances can't be the same if they have different attributes [Spinoza]
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins]
Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins]
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]