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Single Idea 14065
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
]
Full Idea
For two things to be strictly identical, they must have all properties in common. That means, among other things, that they must start to exist at the same time and cease to exist at the same time.
Gist of Idea
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
Source
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.188
A Reaction
I don't accept that coming into existence at time t is a 'property' of a thing. Coincident objects give you the notion of 'existing as' something, which complicates the whole story.
The
14 ideas
from Allan Gibbard
14064
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If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent
[Gibbard]
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14066
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A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay
[Gibbard]
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
[Gibbard]
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14065
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Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
[Gibbard]
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14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it
[Gibbard]
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14069
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We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay'
[Gibbard]
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14071
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Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria
[Gibbard]
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14072
|
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
[Gibbard]
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14073
|
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
[Gibbard]
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations
[Gibbard]
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14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition
[Gibbard]
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14077
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Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts
[Gibbard]
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14078
|
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
[Gibbard]
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14079
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Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
[Gibbard]
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