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Single Idea 14067
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
]
Full Idea
The piece of clay and the statue are 'objects' - that is to say, they can be designated with proper names, and the logic we ordinarily use will still apply.
Gist of Idea
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
Source
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], I)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.190
A Reaction
An interesting indication of the way that 'object' is used in modern analytic philosophy, which may not be the way that it is used in ordinary English. The number 'seven', for example, seems to be an object by this criterion.
The
14 ideas
from Allan Gibbard
14064
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If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent
[Gibbard]
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14066
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A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay
[Gibbard]
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
[Gibbard]
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14065
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Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
[Gibbard]
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14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it
[Gibbard]
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14069
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We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay'
[Gibbard]
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14071
|
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria
[Gibbard]
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14072
|
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
[Gibbard]
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14073
|
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
[Gibbard]
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations
[Gibbard]
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14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition
[Gibbard]
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14077
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Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts
[Gibbard]
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14078
|
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
[Gibbard]
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14079
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Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
[Gibbard]
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