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Single Idea 14078
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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Full Idea
It is meaningless to talk of the same concrete thing in different possible worlds, ...but it makes sense to speak of the same individual concept, which is just a function which assigns to each possible world in a set an individual in that world.
Gist of Idea
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
Source
Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], VII)
Book Ref
-: 'Journal of Symbolic Logic' [-], p.208
A Reaction
A lovely bold response to the problem of transworld identity, but one which needs investigation. It sounds very promising to me. 'Aristotle' is a cocept, not a name. There is no separate category of 'names'. Wow. (Attach dispositions to concepts?).
The
14 ideas
from 'Contingent Identity'
14064
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If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent
[Gibbard]
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14066
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A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay
[Gibbard]
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
[Gibbard]
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14065
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Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
[Gibbard]
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14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it
[Gibbard]
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14069
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We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay'
[Gibbard]
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14071
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Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria
[Gibbard]
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14072
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Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
[Gibbard]
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14073
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Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
[Gibbard]
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations
[Gibbard]
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14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition
[Gibbard]
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14077
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Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts
[Gibbard]
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14078
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Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
[Gibbard]
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14079
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Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
[Gibbard]
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